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This paper examines the effects of international income transfers on welfare and 
capital accumulation in a one-sector overlapping generations model.  It is shown 
that a strong form of the transfer paradox-- in which the donor country 
experiences a welfare gain while the recipient country experiences a welfare 
loss—may occur both in and out of steady state.  In addition, it is shown that a 
weak form of the transfer paradox—where either the donor or recipient (but not 
both) experience paradoxical welfare effects—may characterize all segments of 
the transition path not already characterized by the strong transfer paradox.  The 
results are explained by the effects of transfers on world capital accumulation 
and the world interest rate, which imply secondary intertemporal welfare effects 
large enough to dominate the initial effects of the income transfer.  
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  1  In this paper we examine the effects of an international income transfer in 
a one-sector overlapping generations model.  This adds to an extensive but 
dated literature that examines the welfare effects of such transfers in a static 
trade environment and also to a smaller, more recent literature that reconsiders 
the consequences of transfers in a growth setting.  Despite the emphasis on 
dynamics found in the latter more closely related research, the literature has yet 
to definitively pin down the effects of permanent transfers both in and out of 
steady state equilibrium.  This paper does just that, and in the process 
demonstrates that versions of the transfer paradox—most generally recognized 
as a situation in which the donor benefits from a transfer at the expense of the 
recipient-- may arise both in the steady state and also at all dates comprising the 
transition to that steady state.  As will be shown, these welfare effects emerge as 
a direct consequence of the transfer’s effects on world capital accumulation and 
the intertemporal terms of trade.   
  In our two-country model, residents of the donor and recipient countries 
are distinguished only by differences in their intertemporal discount rate, which 
implies differences in the national propensities to save. Capital is assumed to be 
perfectly mobile across these two countries so that a common world capital-labor 
ratio and interest rate prevail at every date. The transfer under consideration is 
both fixed in size and permanent; that is, an equal amount will be transferred 
from the donor to the recipient country in each and every period. Because the 
transfer alters savings in both countries, it is responsible for changes in the world 
capital accumulation path.  Thus, in addition to the direct effect of the transfer on 
  2welfare of the donor and recipient countries, there are indirect effects that arise to 
reflect the status of each country in the international credit market (ie, as a 
borrower or lender) and also the effect of the transfer on the the world interest 
rate in each period.  The transfer is `paradoxical’ when these indirect effects are 
both opposite in sign and larger in magnitude than the direct effects.   
  Our main theoretical findings are the following.  When the initial steady 
state is at the golden rule, the transition path can be characterized by both strong 
and weak forms of the transfer paradox:  in the former, both countries experience 
a paradoxical welfare effect whereas, in the latter, only one of the two countries 
is paradoxically affected by the transfer.  More precisely, we identify a single 
sufficient condition under which there is a weak transfer paradox in the short-run 
followed by a strong transfer paradox in the long-run.  When the initial steady 
state is away from the golden rule, a strong transfer paradox is still possible in 
the steady state, but dynamic (in)efficiency increases support for the weak 
version of the paradox.   
    Our results concerning the transfer paradox are noteworthy on three 
accounts.  First, our steady state findings lend clarity to an existing literature that 
incorporates permanent transfers into the one-sector overlapping generations 
model so as to determine the long run welfare effects for the donor and recipient 
countries.  Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) argue that the transfer paradox is 
possible both at and away from the golden rule steady state.
1   However, 
                                                      
1 Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) also claim that, away from the golden rule, a transfer may be Pareto-
improving.  Both claims are said to be consistent with market stability.  Unfortunately, all of these claims 
are brought to question by a technical oversight that is described in our footnote 2.  Our steady state results 
revisit each of these claims and we are therefore indebted to the earlier analysis. 
  3Haaparanta (1989) correctly identified an oversight in this analysis
2 and 
subsequently argued that the results concerning the paradox were only valid 
when the initial steady state is dynamically inefficient.   Tan (1998) later argued 
that a steady state transfer paradox does not occur in the one-sector overlapping 
generations model when transfers are made specifically from rich to poor 
countries, where a rich country is defined as that which has the higher level of 
per capita savings.
3  This claim also contradicts Galor and Polemarchakis, who 
did not specify a particular ranking of savings levels across countries.  As it 
stands, the perspective of the literature is thus skeptical towards the possibility of 
a transfer paradox in a `sensible’ dynamic model of international transfers.  Our 
paper demonstrates that the skepticism is entirely unfounded.
4 We reconsider 
the conclusions of Galor and Polemarchakis and demonstrate their validity after 
the oversight noted by Haaparanta is corrected.
5  Also, we show that a transfer 
from a high saving country to a low saving country is entirely compatible with a 
steady state transfer paradox, in reversal of Tan.  Overall, we build a case for 
revising the dynamic literature’s perspective towards the transfer problem; in the 
                                                      
2 Specifically, Galor and Polemarchakis inadvertently equate national savings to domestic investment for 
each country when deriving their welfare expressions despite having made the assumption of international 
capital mobility.  
3 To be less brief, but more accurate, Tan’s claim that the paradox does not arise requires first that the 
difference between the capital-labor ratio of the donor and recipient not be too large.  However, in this 
setting, the capital-labor ratios of the two countries must be equal in equilibrium, which implies that Tan’s 
requirement is in fact always satisfied. 
4 The analysis presented in Haaparanta (1989) was concerned with the effects of temporary, rather than 
permanent, transfers. And, as already noted, the conclusions of Tan (1998) are derived without 
acknowledging the role of international capital mobility on steady state capital-labor ratios. With these 
shortcomings, it is not clear that Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) has been invalidated.  
5 In a recent paper, Yanagihara (2006) also demonstrates that corrected versions of the welfare expressions 
used by Galor and Polemarchakis cannot be signed under dynamic efficiency, which therefore leaves room 
for a transfer paradox.  However, that paper neither derives a sufficient condition for the occurrence of a 
transfer paradox, nor considers out of steady state behavior, as we do in subsequent sections. 
  4one-sector overlapping generations model there is a possibility of a steady state 
transfer paradox both at and away from the golden rule.  
  A further comparison with the conclusions drawn from the earlier static 
modeling of transfers reveals the second noteworthy aspect of our findings. In 
the static literature, it was widely established that a transfer paradox cannot 
occur under market stability except in the presence of a distortion, or 
alternatively, a bystander to the transfer (see, for example, Bhagwati and Brecher 
(1982), Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1985), Gale (1974), Bhagwati, Brecher and 
Hatta (1983), Yano (1983)).  This conclusion stands in stark contrast to our own, 
where the transfer paradox can be a robust feature of a dynamic, general 
equilibrium, even when instability, distortions and bystanders are excluded.  The 
key to understanding this theoretical turnabout lies in the identification of the 
effects of transfers on world savings and investment.  In basic terms, transfer-
induced changes in world capital accumulation can introduce hitherto 
unrecognized supply-side effects that intensify movements in the (intertemporal) 
terms of trade.  Therefore, if the earlier literature is seen to undermine the 
general theoretical relevance of the transfer paradox, then this paper clarifies that 
it is primarily the adherence to a static modeling framework that makes it so.  In 
other words, the needed revisal in perspective towards the transfer paradox goes 
beyond the confines of the dynamic literature discussed above. 
  A final theoretical contribution follows from the inclusion of the welfare 
effects of transfers on generations living in the transition to the steady state.  In 
so doing, our analysis is more comprehensive than Galor and Polemarchakis 
  5(1987), Tan (1998) and Yanagihara (2006), who focus only one the steady state 
effects of permanent transfers, and Haaparanta (1989), who is primarily 
concerned with short- and long-run effects of a one-shot, temporary transfer.  By 
including an analysis of the transitional periods we are able to preempt the notion 
that steady state implications are somehow `special’ and may belie non-
paradoxical, short-run welfare effects. Again, the occurrence of a transfer 
paradox in our model is not a peculiarity of the steady state, but rather is shown 
to be a potentially pervasive feature of a world growth path.   
  Section 2 describes the environment and world equilibrium absent 
international transfers.  Section 3 introduces the transfers when the initial steady 
state is at the golden rule capital-labor ratio and separately describes the welfare 
effects for generations born in the initial period of the transfer, the transitional 
periods, and also the steady state. Section 4 summarizes these results and 
identifies a sufficient condition for the occurrence of a transfer paradox at all 
dates along the equilibrium path.  This condition is then reinterpreted as a 
restriction on the elasticity of factor substitution.  Section 5 considers the impact 
that dynamic (in)efficiency may have on prospects for the transfer paradox.   
Specifically, we show that the steady state transfer paradox cannot be ruled out, 
although the transfer may lead to welfare deterioration in both countries when the 
initial steady state is dynamically efficient and a mutual welfare improvement 
when it is dynamically inefficient.  A parametric example in Section 6 
demonstrates the transfer paradox under the assumption of dynamic efficiency.  
The concluding remarks are then made in Section 7. 
  6 
2.  Two-country model with capital mobility 
  There are two countries in the world economy, a donor,  , and recipient,  D
R , of an international income transfer. Let denote the number of individuals 
that are born in each of the two countries at date t.  Each member of generation 
lives for two periods and is `young’ at time   and `old’ at date  .  Both 
populations grow equally and exogenously, according to
t L
t t 1 t +
1 (1 ) tt Ln L − = + 0 n > ,  , 
where the   members of generation 0 are assumed to live only during the initial 
period,  .  Thus, at each date  , both countries are populated by two 
overlapping generations comprised of the young members of generation    and 
the old members of generation 
0 L
1 t = 1 t ≥
t
1 t −  . 
  Each individual is endowed with one unit of labor when young; thus, 
also denotes the endowment of labor in each country at date  .  In addition, at 
, the initial old in each of the two countries possess equal amounts of the 
initial capital stock.  Let  denote the initial ratio of capital to labor available for 
production in the first period.  It is assumed that capital does not depreciate and 
that the stock of capital can grow via production.  The capital-labor ratio in each 





  Labor is immobile across the two countries and is hired by firms in a 
national, competitive labor market.  Capital, however, is internationally mobile 
and is priced in a global, competitive market. Firms comprise the demand side of 
  7the market for capital, whereas individuals in both countries supply capital 
acquired via savings and investment.  
 
2.1    Production and factor markets 
  The two countries utilize a common technology in their production of the 
world’s only output.  This technology is represented by a linearly homogenous 





t f k , where  is the input of capital per worker and  denotes the intensive 
form of the production function.  For all  ,  it is assumed that  , 










t fk ′ > ()0
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t fk ′′ <
0 lim ( ) 0
k fk
→ = , 
 and  . 
0 lim ( )
k fk
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jand  respectively denote the date t payment per unit of capital 
and labor service in country  .  Firms demand capital and labor from individuals 
so as to maximize profits.  That is,  is chosen so as to equate the respective 
marginal productivities of capital and labor to their factor payments:   









tt rf k ′ = () ' ()
jj j
tt t wf kk f k =−
j
t ,. jD R =  
 
2.2  Consumption and savings 
 
  The residents of the two countries, always equal in number, have 
preferences that are represented by well-behaved utility functions,  , 
which are defined over youthful and old age consumption, denoted  and 
,,




t d +  
respectively for members of generation  .  Labor income earned by each young  t
  8individual is divided between immediate consumption expenditures and savings, 
the latter of which is used to finance consumption when old.  Thus the 
optimization problem for each member of generation tin country  is to maximize 
subject to budget constraints in the respective periods of life, 
















t ρ + is the 
gross return on date  savings.  The solution to these problems can be 
represented by the savings functions   where  .  In 
addition, it is assumed that  . The initial old, living only at date 1, purchase 
consumption goods using the proceeds from renting their capital to firms and 
then selling it to the young of generation 2.
t
1 (, ) t , ,
j jjj





6  For all generations other than the 
initial old, the optimal savings function implies a corresponding indirect utility 
function  1 (, )
jjj











  The global capital market equates, in per capita terms, the aggregate 
savings of each young generation with investment; that is, with the capital stock 
to be made available for production in the subsequent period.  Let  and   t s 1 t k +  
respectively denote per capita savings at time tand the world capital-labor ratio 
at time  .  In the absence of depreciation, the return on savings is given by  1 t +
                                                      
1
6 As will become apparent below,  11
jj dk ρ = .   
  91 1
j




.  Then, the international capital market is in equilibrium at date t 
when  11
DR
tt ρ ρρ ++ == + 1 --or equivalently  11
DR
ttt rrr + + == + --and also  
11
















   (0.1) 
 
where the latter expression equates the world demand for and supply of capital 
at date t.   
  The demand for capital in each country is determined via an equality 
between the world interest rate and the marginal productivity of capital, 
.  Thus, by monotonicity of  ,  11 () (
D
tt rf k f k ++ ′′ == f 11
DR
ttt kkk + + == +
t
1 t
 at every date.  
That is, the equilibrium capital-labor ratio of the two countries will be identical at 
each date and will consequently be equal to the world average capital-labor ratio.  
From this equality, two things follow.  First, despite the international immobility of 
labor, wages will be equalized across the two countries,  .   And 




1 (1 ) ( ( ), ( )) tt nk swk k ρ + += + , which implicitly defines  1 t k +  as a function of  .    t k








dk k s f k
H






   (0.2) 
 
 
where  and  () /2 0
DR
ww w ss s ≡+ > ( )/2 0
DR ss s ρρ ρ ≡ +> .  The inequality implies that, 
for  , the evolution of the capital stock is monotonic.  Following Galor & 
Ryder (1989), we further assume that   which, together with the 
assumptions on the technology, are sufficient to establish the existence of at 




  10least one nontrivial steady state equilibrium   such that (1 k ) ( ( ), ( )) nk swk k ρ + = .  
We will restrict our attention to those steady states that are (locally) stable; that 
is, to those that satisfy .  () 1 Hk<
  For our purposes, however, the market-clearing condition can be written in 










)      (0.3) 
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1 t + ⎤ ⎦
1 t r
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3. Transfers  and  welfare 
 
  Next, we introduce an income transfer from the young residents of the 
donor country to the young residents of the recipient country in every period; that 
is, following Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) we consider a permanent 
international transfer.  In Sections 3.1-3.3, we respectively examine the welfare 
implications of the transfer for generations belonging to the steady state, the 
initial and the transitional generations.  For each group, we identify a separate 
  11preliminary condition that will, in Section 4, be used to derive our conclusions 
regarding the transfer paradox. 
 
3.1 Steady  state  generations 
 
 Let  τ denote the transfer from the young residents of country   to their 
counterparts in country 
D
R at each date and redefine   to denote the transfer-
inclusive wage of country 
j
t w
j .  Then, for  ,  1 t ≥
D
tt ww τ = −  and 
R
tt ww τ =+ , where 
τ  is a small, positive constant that does not exceed the donor’s wage at any 
date.  The savings functions become  ,  1 (, )
jj j
tt ss w ρ + = t , jD R =  and the effect of 



















tt t dw d k dr d
   (0.6) 
 
where  // 1 τ τ =− − // 1
R
tt t dw d k dr d ττ ,  = −+ , and  1 /
jj j
tw t Vs V ρ ρ + = .  In 
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=+ − ⎢ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
⎥    (0.8) 
 
 
The first term in each expression represents the direct effect of transfers on 
steady state income and welfare and the second term represents the indirect 
  12effects of the transfer that are channeled through the changes in the 
intertemporal terms of trade.   
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ww ss − is positive or negative as the donor or recipient has the respectively 







d nf s k f s ρ τ
′′ −−
=
′′ ′′ +− +
     (0.10) 
 
The stability condition implies that the denominator is positive, and hence 
() sgn sgn
D R
ww dr d s s τ =− .  Thus, the steady state interest rate is increased 
(decreased) by a transfer when the donor has a greater (lesser) propensity to 
save from wages than does the recipient.  This is because such a transfer 
decreases (increases) the world supply of savings and also therefore world 
steady state capital accumulation.  
To begin, we assume that 1 n ρ = + ; that is, that the steady state is that 
associated with the golden rule.
7  There are two immediate implications.  First, 
using (0.1), it is straightforward to demonstrate that sgn sgn
DR dV d dV d τ τ =− . In 
other words, at the golden rule, if the transfer improves welfare of the donor then 
it will necessarily worsen the welfare of the recipient.  Second, since  , 
(0.7) can be written 
/(1 ) ks n =+
                                                      
7 This (temporary) assumption is analytically convenient and facilitates a comparison of our results with 
those in the existing literature.  We consider steady states away from the golden rule in Section 5. 













=− + ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
.   (0.11) 
 
Clearly, if  () ( sgn sgn )
D RD
ww ss ss −= −
R , then (0.11) shows that the intertemporal 
welfare effect is always positive in the donor country.
8  Also then, the 
intertemporal welfare effect is always negative in the recipient country. More 
particularly, regardless of the ranking of savings and savings propensities across 
countries, the intertemporal terms of trade effect always changes in favor of the 
transfer paradox.   
  How can this be explained?  For insight, note that the market-clearing 
condition (0.1) implies() ( ) /(1 ) /(1 )
DR sn ksn k + −= − +−; the net foreign 
investment of the high-saving country will be equal in magnitude to, and of 
opposite sign from, the low-saving country.  If, for example, the donor country 
has the higher average savings, it will be a net lender in the international capital 
market, whereas the recipient will be a net borrower.  Under the same 
assumption, however, (0.10) implies 0 dr dτ > .  In this case, the positive welfare 
effect described by (0.11) is derived from the fact that the international lender is 
better off when there is an increase in the interest rate.  Simultaneously, the 
recipient country, being an international borrower, will be worse off as a result of 
the increasing interest rate.  If, on the other hand, the donor is the low saving 
country, it will then be the international borrower but this time (0.10) implies     
0 dr dτ < .  The positive effect on welfare reflects that the international borrower 
                                                      
8 The assumption that  () ( ) sgn sgn
D RD
ww ss ss −= −
R  is valid in the case of log-linear utility functions, 
for example. 
  14benefits from a reduction in the interest rate. And, the recipient, being the 
international lender, experiences a decline in welfare as a result of the lower 
interest rate.   
  For the intertemporal terms of trade to move by an amount that is 









.   (0.12) 
 
Let  ε denote the elasticity of substitution so that  . Then, 
substitution into (0.2) and (0.10) respectively implies that 

















dk s H τ
⎛⎞ − ⎛ = ⎜⎟ ⎜ − ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
⎞
⎟    (0.13) 
 
  
Using the latter expression in (0.12), we are able to identify a sufficient condition 
under which the effects of the transfer on steady state welfare are paradoxical 
from the perspective of both the donor and recipient countries. 
 









⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ − −
>+ ⎢ ⎜ ⎜⎟
⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
⎥ ⎟ , then steady state welfare in the donor 
country is improved by the transfer and steady state welfare in the recipient 
country is worsened.  
  15   
 
3.2  Initial young and old 
 
  In the initial period, there is a fixed endowment of capital; consequently, 
regardless of the transfer,  11 0 dw dr = = . Thus, the initial old of both countries are 
unaffected by the transfer and the initial effects fall upon generation 1. With 
,   1 0 dr = 1
D dw dτ =− ,  1









ww f ks s dr




     (0.14) 
 
 
Consider first the effects of the transfer on the initial young in the donor country. 
Under the stability assumption,  ( ) 2 sgn
D R
ww dr d s s τ =−; thus, the effect of the 
transfer on the interest rate at  2 t =  is positive when the donor has the higher 
savings propensity and negative otherwise.  
The effect on the net wage, however, is always negative:  .  
Thus, from the   version of (0.6),  if the donor has the lower savings 
propensity then it is immediate that the welfare of generation 1 is reduced 
( ) by the transfer.  Hence, there can be no transfer paradox from the 
perspective of the initial young in the donor country.  Otherwise, if the donor has 
the higher savings propensity, then an increase in the interest rate works against 
the negative direct effect of the transfer, and the overall welfare effect is 
ambiguous.   
1 /1




  16  To resolve this ambiguity, we use a first order Taylor approximation to 
linearize (0.3) around the initial steady state.  Expressed in terms of deviations 
from the initial steady state (for example, letting  11 tt dr r r ++ = − ), the approximation 
is given by    2 dr = ( ) 2
DR
ww w Hs s k s d τ ⎡ − ⎣
⎤
⎦ , where it should be recalled that   1 0 dr = .  
Thus, if the donor country is the high saving country, then the transfer improves 











=− + > ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟
⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
; 











.   (0.15) 
  A similar exercise from the perspective of the recipient implies that 
generation 1 in the recipient country experiences an unambiguous improvement 
in welfare  when the donor is the high saver.  If the donor is a low saver, 
however, then the transfer worsens the welfare of the same generation 
when  
( 1 0













   (0.16) 
 
  Putting these insights together, we have concluded that if the donor is the 
high saver and  ( ) 2
DD R
ww w sHs s s s − 1 > , then welfare effect of generation 1 in the 
donor country is paradoxical.  However, under the same assumption, welfare of 
generation 1 in the recipient countries is improved by the transfer.  If the donor is 
  17the low saver and () 2
RD R
ww w sHs s s s −− 1 > , then welfare of generation 1 in the 
recipient country is worsened by the transfer.  Under the same assumption, the 
welfare of generation 1 in the donor country is also worsened.  The conclusion to 
be drawn is that the effects of the transfer on welfare may be viewed as 
paradoxical from the perspective of generation 1 in at most one of the two 
countries. 
 
Proposition 2:  Suppose the initial steady state is at the golden rule.  Then, 
if the donor is a high saver and  ( ) 2
D DR
ww w H ss s s s >− , then the welfare of 
generation 1 in the donor and recipient countries is improved by the transfer.  If 
the donor is a low saver and ( ) 2
RD R
ww w H ss s s s >− − , then the welfare of 




3.3 Transitional  generations 
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   (0.18) 
 
Recalling that  ( ) 2 sgn sgn /2
DR
ww dr d s s τ =− , it then follows from (0.9), it follows   
that  for all  .  Thus, (0.17) and (0.18) are of  () 1 sgn sgn /2
DR
tw w dr s s + =− 1 t ≥
  18ambiguous sign as are the welfare effects for all subsequent generations in the 
donor and recipient countries.   
  To resolve the ambiguity in sign, we again utilize a first order Taylor 
expansion of (0.3) around the initial steady state and express the result in terms 
of deviations from the initial steady state. We obtain a first order difference 
equation,  () ( 1 2
DR
ttw w w dr Hdr H s s ks d ) τ + =+ − , whose definite solution is 




t dr dr dr H dr
− =− + 1 H < < , the path is non-oscillatory and 
convergent.  With  , we can write  , which again implies that 
interest rate changes will be positive and increasing over time when the donor 
has the higher propensity to save from wages, but will be negative and 
decreasing when the recipient has the higher propensity to save.  For 
generations   in the donor country,  (0.17) can then be expressed by  
1 0 dr =
1 (1 )
t
t dr H dr
− =−
1 t >





dV V k H H dr dτ
ρ
− ⎡⎤ ⎛⎞




in the neighborhood of the steady state.  From this expression and (0.10) it is 
possible to show that, if the donor is the high saver and 1
D sHs > , then 
1
D D
tt dV dV + <  for .  Also, similar procedures conducted from the perspective of 
the recipient yields the corresponding result that if the donor is the high saver 




tt dV dV + >  for .  Both results 
follow from the status of the country in the international capital market and the 
associated movements in the interest rate discussed above over time.  
1 t ≥
  19  To sum this discussion, as well as a similarly constructed argument that 
instead assumes that the donor is the low-saving county, we have the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 3  Suppose the initial steady state is at the golden rule.  Then, if the 
donor is the high saver and 
D Hs s >  or, if the donor is the low saver 
and
R Hs s > , then the effect of a permanent transfer on the welfare of the donor 
country is increasing over time, whereas it is decreasing over time for the 
recipient country.   
 
4. Discussion 
  In this section, we summarize the effects of the transfer on the various 
generations in both countries and discuss implications regarding the occurrence 
of a transfer paradox.   
  We begin by noting that the sufficient conditions identified by Proposition 2 
are stronger than the conditions identified by Propositions 1 and 3.  
 
Corollary  If the donor is the high saver and ( ) 2
D DR
ww w H ss s s s >− , then 









⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ − −
>+ ⎢ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟
⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦
⎥ . If the donor is the low saver 
  20and  () 2
RD R
ww w H ss s s s >− − , then 









⎡⎤ ⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ − −
>+ ⎢⎥ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟




  Thus, if the donor is the high saver and ( ) 2
D DR
ww w H ss s s s >−
1
, then 
Propositions 1, 2 and 3 together  imply that in the vicinity of the golden rule 
steady state,    12 0 ... ...
DD DD
tt dV dV dV dV + <<< <
D dV <  and   
.  The transfer improves welfare of all generations in the donor 
country and worsens welfare of late generations in the recipient country.  Thus, 
the donor’s experience is paradoxical at every date, whereas the recipient’s 
welfare effect is paradoxical only in the latter periods.   
12 ...
RR
T dV dV dV >>
R
R
                                                     
1 0 ...
R
T dV dV + >> >
  The first result reflects the status of the donor as a lender and the steady 
rise in the world interest rate.  If welfare improves for the initial young in the high 
saving donor/lender country, then it is improved at every date including the 
steady state. Moreover, the welfare gain is increasing in each period and the 
largest welfare gain belongs to the steady state generations, where the increase 
in the interest rate is maximized.  The second result reflects the status of the 
recipient as an international borrower.  Initially, generations in the recipient 
country are better off as a direct result of the transfer but the welfare effect is 
decreasing over time and eventually becomes negative.  As the debtor, the rising 
interest rate erodes welfare until eventually the associated (negative) effect 
outweighs the direct benefits of the transfer.  
 
9 The proof of Corollary 1is entirely algebraic and is therefore left to the interested reader. 
  21  If, instead, the donor is a low saver and  () 2
RD R
ww w H ss s s s >− − , then it 
can be shown that  in the vicinity of the golden rule, 
11 ... 0 ...
D DD
TT dV dV dV dV + << << <
D R  and    .   
The transfer worsens the welfare of all generations in the recipient country and 
improves welfare for the latter generations in the donor country. Thus, the 
recipient’s experience is paradoxical at every date, whereas the donor’s welfare 
is affected paradoxically only for the latter periods.  
12 0
RR dV dV >> 1 ... ...
RR
TT dV dV dV + >> >
  The interpretation is, of course, analogous to the previous case.  Here, the 
donor is a borrower facing an interest rate that is decreasing over time, with a 
benefit that eventually exceeds the direct cost of the transfer payment.  Also, the 
welfare loss experienced by the recipient in the first period is exacerbated at 
each subsequent date due to the fact that it is a lender facing a declining rate of 
interest.      
  We now summarize the findings of this section with the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 4:  Suppose the initial steady state is at the golden rule. If the 
donor is the high saver and  ( ) 2
D DR
ww w H ss s s s >−
)
, then the welfare of all 
generations in the donor country and the early generations in the recipient 
country is improved by a permanent transfer, whereas the welfare of the late 
generations in the recipient country is worsened.  If the donor is the low saver 
and  ( 2
RD R
ww w H ss s s s >− − , then the welfare of all generations in the recipient 
  22country and the early generations in the donor country is worsened by a 
permanent transfer, whereas the welfare of the late generations in the donor 
country is improved.   
 
  It might be useful, in interpreting Proposition 4, to introduce the notion of a 
weak and strong version of the transfer paradox.  Suppose a weak transfer 
paradox is said to occur at a point in time when either generation in the donor or 
the recipient country experiences a paradoxical welfare effect.  And, a strong 
transfer paradox is said to occur at a point in time when the welfare effects of 
both the donor and the recipient countries are paradoxical. Then, Proposition 4 
implies that, regardless of assumption regarding the ranking of savings 
propensities for the two countries, there are conditions under which the early 
periods are characterized by the weak transfer paradox and the late periods by a 
strong transfer paradox.  The overriding conclusion is therefore that there are 
sufficient conditions under which some version of the transfer paradox applies at 
every date in the transition to a steady state.     
  It is possible to say more about the condition of Proposition 4 and the 
circumstances under which the transfer paradox will arise. If the donor is the high 
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  23where   / sw w ws s η ≡  and  / s ss ρρ η ρ ≡ .  Thus, the elasticity of substitution cannot 
be too large for the transfer paradox to arise. However, the condition for local 
stability,  1 H < , also places restrictions on the elasticity of substitution.  From 
(1.20)  we require 
sw s
rk w r
wr k wr k
ρ η η
ρ
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞ − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ++ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
ε <  (0.20) 
 
so the stability requirement implies that the elasticity of substitution cannot be too 
small. These two conditions thus give an upper and lower bound for the elasticity 
of substitution,
10 from which it is clear that the range of elasticities that yield the 










>    (0.21) 
 
 
Had we instead assumed that the donor is the low saving country, then the range 










−>   
In either case, this requires the two countries to have different savings and 
savings propensities, as should be intuitively obvious. As noted above, the 
transfer paradox described by Proposition 4 does not require a particular ranking 
of savings and savings propensities—either the donor or the recipient could be 
the high-saving country. However, it is now evident that the larger is the 
                                                      
10 The condition on the elasticity of substitution becomes parametric when the production function is CES. 
  24difference in savings and/or savings propensities, the wider is the range of 
elasticities that are compatible with the transfer paradox.  
 
Proposition 5:  Suppose the initial steady state is at the golden rule.   For 
intermediate values of the elasticity of substitution, the transition path arising 
from a permanent transfer may be characterized by a weak transfer paradox in 
the early periods and a strong transfer paradox in the late periods and steady 
state, regardless of the ranking of savings rates across countries. 
 
5.  Transfers and dynamic efficiency 
 
  Having demonstrated that the transfer paradox may arise at the golden 
rule, we now explore the effects of initial steady states away from the golden rule.  
For expedience, we confine our discussion to the welfare effects implied for the 
steady state generations. To begin, it is helpful to recognize the following 








d ρ τρ τ ρ
⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ +−
−= −+ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ + ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ τ
, (0.22) 
 
and also the fact that dr dτ  (as given by (0.13)) is unaffected by the 
consideration of dynamic efficiency. 
  At the golden rule,  1 n ρ = + , or equivalently, rn = .  This reduces the 
intertemporal effect to the first term in the decomposition.  This is the case 
described thus far in the paper (and is an ex post justification for the discussion 
                                                      
11 To derive this expression, factor out 
1 ρ
− , add and subtract   inside the bracket, and then rearrange 
terms. 
nk
  25in Section 3.1). Assuming that the conditions for the golden rule transfer paradox 
are met, we explore the implications of introducing 1 n ρ ≠ + . 
   When  the  initial  steady state is away from the golden rule, both terms in 
(0.22) are affected.  Upon substitution of (0.1) and (0.13), the effect of dynamic 
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⎞
⎟  (0.23) 
 
Thus, dynamic inefficiency, or  1 n ρ < + , increases the magnitude of this term 
relative to its golden rule value without changing its sign, whereas dynamic 
efficiency,   1 n ρ >+, decreases the magnitude.   Thus, via this term, dynamic 
inefficiency improves the prospects for a paradoxical steady state welfare effect 
and dynamic efficiency worsens prospects for paradoxical effects. 
  The second term in (0.22) becomes nonzero when initial steady states are 
away from the golden rule.  Other things equal, this term will be opposite in sign 
for an initial steady state that is dynamically efficient in comparison to one that is 
dynamically inefficient.  Either way, an important characteristic of this term is that 
it has a common effect on the donor and recipient alike; thus, via this term, the 
interest rate change will either improve the welfare of the donor and recipient, or, 
it will worsen the welfare of both. This reflects the movement in the world interest 
rate either closer to, or further from, its golden rule value and will weaken the 
prospect for a paradoxical welfare effect for one of the two countries. 
  We next summarize these effects using an example. Consider a transfer 
from a high-saving donor to a low-saving recipient.  The transfer will reduce world 
  26steady state capital accumulation and increase the interest rate.  If the initial 
steady state is above that of the golden rule, then   and the steady state is 
dynamically inefficient.  As noted, the effect described by the first term in (0.22) is 
intensified and thus independently increases the possibility of a strong transfer 
paradox.  The second term introduces an additional positive effect on welfare in 
both countries. For the donor, both terms reflect an increase welfare above and 
beyond that discussed in the golden rule case, thus ensuring a paradoxical 
welfare effect.  For the recipient, the two terms instead imply conflicting effects, 
and the overall welfare change is now ambiguous.  Thus, with the introduction of 
dynamic inefficiency, the possibility of a strong transfer paradox remains.   
Moreover, in cases where the strong paradox does not obtain, there will instead 
be a weak transfer paradox characterized by a welfare-improvement in both 
countries.  
nr >
   If the initial steady state is instead dynamically efficient—that is, if nr < , 
the same transfer would weaken the intensity of the first term without changing 
its sign, and, introduce an additional negative welfare effect common to both 
countries.  Overall, the welfare effects are now ambiguous for the donor and 
unambiguously negative for the recipient.  Thus, the implications for the transfer 
paradox are symmetric to those above.  The strong transfer paradox cannot be 
ruled out by dynamic efficiency, and, when it does not obtain, a weak transfer 
paradox characterized by mutual welfare deterioration will arise.  
    To sum, even when initial steady states are away from the golden rule, the 
possibility of the strong transfer paradox cannot be ruled out on theoretical 
  27grounds.  However, the additional effect introduced by the movement of the world 
capital-labor ratio either towards or away from the golden rule, generates either a 
mutual welfare improvement or deterioration for the two countries, either of which 
tend to decrease prospects for the strong paradox and lend support to the weak 
version of the transfer paradox.
12   
 
6.  A parametric example 
  We now demonstrate our results concerning the transfer paradox using a 
parameterized version of the model. However, as there is no convincing 
evidence that actual economies operate at or beyond the golden rule (see Abel 
et al (1989)), we will confine our attention to a case involving an initial steady 
state that is dynamically efficient. As noted above, relative to an initial steady 
state at the golden rule capital-labor ratio, this assumption tends to work against 
the strong version of the transfer paradox, and in favor of the weak transfer 
paradox. Also, this assumption implies that the steady state welfare effects 
cannot be identified via the sufficient conditions identified by the propositions, but 
rather must be derived from the more general welfare expressions, (0.7) and 
(0.8). Our example highlights that, under different specifications of the saving 
rate, both strong and weak versions of the transfer paradox may arise. 
                                                      
12 These arguments can be made explicit.  The transfer under consideration improves the donor’s welfare 
(and worsens the recipient’s welfare) in a steady state away from the golden rule when (0.22) exceeds 1.  
Now,  (0.13) implies that  () () ( ) ( ) () // 2
DR
ww w kn r d rd n r s s s H H ρτ ρ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ −= − − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣⎦ 1 − .  
Together with(0.23),  the inequality becomes  ( ) ( ) 12 ( 1 ) 1
DR D
ww w Hs s s n s s ρ 1 ⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎤ + −+ − ⎣⎦ > ⎣ ⎦
.  
Clearly,  1 n ρ >+ works against the transfer paradox but is not by itself enough to negate the inequality.  
Similarly, it can be shown that  1 n ρ <+ is not sufficient to negate the possibility of the recipient being 
worse off. 
  28  Assume that the preferences of a resident of country  are given 
by  ,   and the world production technology is 
CES and given by    
,, jj DR = ,
(, ) l n l n
j
tt t t Ucd c d β + =+ (0,1]
j β ∈ 11 +
1
() 1 f kA a k a
γ γ
− − ⎡⎤ =+ − ⎣⎦   
 
0 A > ,   ,  01 a << 1 γ >−  ,  0 γ ≠  
 
For simplicity, we assume that capital depreciates fully each period and also 
set 1 γ = , so that  /(1 ) 1/2 ε γγ =+ = .
13  With these specifications, the initial steady 













where  is the world average savings rate from wages and  ( /2
DR σσ + )
(1 )
jj j σ ββ =+ ,  , is the savings rate for country  , jD R = j .  As is well-known, 
there may be either zero or two positive solutions to this equation; below, 
parameters are chosen to accommodate the latter scenario.  
  Using the specified utility and production functions, (0.7) and (0.8) imply 
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13 This is a somewhat low but nevertheless plausible value for the elasticity of substitution .  Sosin and 
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   (0.25) 
  
where   and  () 1/( 1 ) / na ρσ += − ( ) ( ) (1 ) / 1 / 2 H Ha k a −= − − a . 
 
  To calibrate the model, we set   0.7 a = and  0.36 σ =  (equivalently, 
0.5625 β = ), which respectively imply a capital’s share of 0.29 at the initial steady 
state, and a quarterly average discount factor of 0.99 for a generation of 30 years 
duration.  Also, we set the scale parameter to  20 A =  and the population growth 
rate to  ; the former admits two positive steady states and the second 
implies an annual growth rate for total output of 2.5%. Under these parameter 
values the unique stable steady state is
1.097 n =
5.8471 k = , where  0.57 1 H = < .  At this 
initial steady state, world savings as a fraction of production is 26%, and the 
generational interest rate is 1.3245 (which is equivalent to an annual rate of 
approximately 2.85%).  The latter is therefore consistent with a dynamically 
efficient initial steady state. 
  We further assume that the donor country is the high saving country and, 
noting that the transfer paradox is more likely to arise under large differences in 
the country-specific savings rates, set   and  . 0.71
D σ = 0.01
R σ =
14 With these 
specifications, the left hand side of  (0.24) and (0.25) equal 0.7576 and 0.9479, 
respectively.  The common right hand side of these expressions equals 0.7530.  
Thus, both inequalities are satisfied and this parameterization is consistent with a 
                                                      
14 This implicitly assumes corresponding differences in the 
j β s.  Also, when expressed as a fraction of 
domestic and national product, the domestic savings rate of the donor falls to a more reasonable .5 and .4 
respectively.   
  30strong transfer paradox, despite the fact that the initial steady state is 
dynamically efficient. 
  Admittedly, the assumed values for the world savings rate and the savings 
rate of the donor country, are somewhat high.
15  If, other things equal, we instead 
set  0.3 σ = ,   and  , 0.59
D σ = 0.01
R σ =
16 then there is again a positive stable initial 
steady state,   (with  3.133 k = 0.86 H = <1) but the left hand sides of (0.24) and 
(0.25) now equal -0.2009 and 0.9537 respectively, whereas the right hand side 
equals 0.1714.  Thus, with this change, only the recipient will experience a 
paradoxical welfare effect.  In this case, the weak transfer paradox arises and 
welfare is reduced in both countries.  
    
7. Conclusion 
  In this paper we have analyzed the effects of an international income 
transfer on world capital accumulation and the welfare for both the donor and the 
recipient countries. We find that, if the initial steady state occurs at the golden 
rule capital-labor ratio, then a strong transfer paradox is possible at, and in a 
neighborhood of, the steady state.  Moreover, a weak transfer paradox may 
characterize all earlier dates.  The strong paradox cannot be ruled out by an 
initial steady state that is instead away from the golden rule, although there is 
increased likelihood that the weak version of the transfer paradox will 
characterize the steady state.   
                                                      
15 These savings rates are high, but not unheard of.  Several East Asian economies, including China and 
Singapore, have had national savings rates in excess of 40%. 
16 In this case, the world savings rate when expressed as a fraction of production is 17%,  and national 
savings when expressed as a fraction of national income are 23% and just under 1% for the donor and 
recipient respectively.  
  31  We close with a few remarks related to transfers as we have described 
them in Section 4. The potential discrepancy between the long and short-run 
effects of transfers, namely, the difference between the strong and weak transfer 
paradox, has particular interest when considered in a political context.  Thus far 
we have regarded the transfer as a policy that has been committed to, by the 
donor and recipient alike, in the first period of time.  As has been shown, the 
donor may in fact benefit from this policy at all dates following its adoption, 
whereas the recipient may benefit from the policy only in the short-run. Whereas 
the donor’s commitment to the policy is then consistent with welfare 
maximization, the recipient’s participation is instead subject to time 
inconsistency:  on welfare grounds, the recipient has incentive to adopt the policy 
in the initial period and then renege on it at a later point in time.  Moreover, if the 
donor believes the recipient suffers from myopia, then these welfare results could 
also justify a skeptical perspective towards the actual benevolence of donors 
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